Evidence

LG's advertising arm tells marketers it owns the screen.

“In the fact that we have the glass. We own the glass. We own the TV.”

The president of LG Ad Solutions, the LG-owned company that sells advertising built on what LG televisions collect, speaking to an advertising audience.

Open at 3:38

Caveat The video's captions render the name as "Sergey Mata". Serge Matta is the published name of the LG Ad Solutions president. Confirm against LG's own page before printing it.

They describe the data as first-party, and the coverage as everything on the screen.

“Because, you know, we own the glass, and we have first-party ACR data, automated content recognition data. We understand everything that hits the screen.”

The head of research and development at LG Ad Solutions, in the same presentation.

Open at 3:45

Caveat First name given as Justin in the video. Surname not captioned.

The pitch includes knowing who is in the household and following them to their phones.

“We know who's in the LG household. We know which devices are there. We know what you're exposed to on TV, and we know how to extend that reach into mobile.”

From an LG Ad Solutions marketing presentation played in the investigation.

Open at 13:42

Content recognition samples the picture and the sound, and it runs when the set is used as a monitor.

“ACR is automatic content recognition that harvests data from devices like TVs, including screenshots of what the TV is showing and audio snippets coming out of the TV speakers. ACR can also run when the TV is used as a monitor.”

The investigation's own working definition, given in narration: audio or video data is turned into a fingerprint and sent to the vendor's servers.

Open at 13:20

Caveat This definition mentions screenshots. For current LG firmware the same investigation found a fingerprint is sent, not an image, which is the next entry.

What leaves the television is a fingerprint, not a picture file.

Researchers found no evidence that current firmware uploads JPEG or PNG screenshots. A small downscaled frame and a short audio window are hashed on the set, and the hash is what is sent. The set also downloads what looks like a fingerprint database from the vendor's domains. An earlier public incident involved raw file names being sent.

Packet capture and firmware analysis Open at 1:48:08

Caveat We include this because it cuts against the scarier version of the story. Anyone saying these televisions upload screenshots of your screen is overstating what current evidence shows.

Amazon says its Fire TV televisions fingerprint what you watch through a cable box or other connected device.

“To do this, Amazon creates a digital fingerprint of the content you watch on your TV from encoded audio or pixel samples of the content.”

Amazon says the fingerprint is matched against a database of movies, TV shows and ads, that fingerprints with no match, such as a home video, are discarded, and that the viewing data may be combined with account and device identifiers. The switch is Settings > Preferences > Privacy Settings > Automatic Content Recognition.

Open the document, Read 23 Sep 2026

Caveat This is Amazon's own description, not a measurement. Amazon says turning it off does not change whether you see ads, though they may repeat more.

Hisense's VIDAA policy says viewing data goes to an ad partner that also reaches other devices on your home connection.

“Viewing Data will be used to help our advertising partner Nexxen and its partners select, deliver and measure personalized ads shown to you on your Smart TV or other linked devices sharing the same IP address, based on audience segmentation created from your viewing habits.”

The same section says the Enhanced Viewing Service matches on-screen audio against a database of programming, and that the data collected can include your IP address, viewing history, and behavioral and demographic information.

Open the document, 15 Aug 2023

Caveat The policy describes an opt-in service and what it may do. It is not a measurement.

A television used only as an HDMI monitor still made 44 connections to the content-recognition service.

An LG G3 with the terms accepted, showing nothing but a laptop over HDMI. Across the session it reached 29 different endpoints 107 times, 44 of those to the Alphonso content-recognition service, and sent about 4 MB.

Wireshark, with the switch port mirrored Open at 29:36

A second set, tested the same way, behaved the same way.

A 43 inch QNED 73B used as a plain monitor for about fifty minutes: 22 endpoints, 157 connections, 54 of them to the content-recognition service, 5.2 MB sent.

Wireshark, with the switch port mirrored Open at 29:49

Watching the television's own channels sent more than ten times as many connections to the recognition service.

The same set over a similar period, this time watching the built-in channels: 60 endpoints, 847 connections, 618 of them to the content-recognition service, against 54 when it was used as a monitor. Total data sent was lower, about 4.5 MB against 5.2 MB.

Wireshark, with the switch port mirrored Open at 30:13

A set with no agreements accepted still talked to advertising and customer-data endpoints.

Before accepting anything, over an hour, the set reached eight endpoints including LG's customer data and smart advertising platforms, made 38 DNS queries to LG domains, transferred about 8.9 MB, and repeatedly scanned for nearby devices. No content recognition was observed in this state.

Wireshark, with the switch port mirrored Open at 28:43

The television enumerated at least 38 other devices on the network.

Phones, watches, a 3D printer, thermostats, gateways and staff laptops, found by the set scanning the local network.

Traffic capture and the set's own logs Open at 17:33

Caveat The scan is confirmed. Whether the full device list is uploaded was inferred from encrypted traffic, and a legitimate device-discovery motive is possible. Treat the upload as an open question, not a finding.

One set was estimated to send in the order of 4 GB of content-recognition data a month.

An extrapolation from the measured sessions, described as predominantly text fingerprints.

Open at 21:22

Caveat This is an estimate scaled up from captures of a few hours, not a month of measurement.

On a Samsung set, the content-recognition traffic stopped when the setting was switched off.

“On TVs like the Samsung S95F, the data was clear enough for us to isolate. With ACR enabled, they sent regular bursts of data to identifiable endpoints, but when we disabled ACR, that traffic stopped.”

RTINGS set up each device twice, once with content recognition allowed and once without, and captured its traffic. Its written report shows the Samsung S95F sending regular spikes to log-ingestion.samsungacr.com while playing Netflix with consent given, and none after the setting was turned off.

Wireshark, each device set up twice, with and without consent Open at 1:58

Caveat The traffic was encrypted, so this shows timing and destination, not contents.

On most of the TVs RTINGS tested, the traffic could not show whether the opt-out worked.

“On other TVs like the TCL Q8K, we couldn't immediately separate ACR-related traffic from ordinary background communication. That made it harder for us to actually verify what's happening when you do or don't consent.”

RTINGS tested ten TVs, a smart monitor and four streaming devices. Its written report says the traffic was clear enough to see the opt-out work on three TVs: the Samsung S95F, Sony Bravia 8 II and LG G5. On the others, switching consent off made no obvious change to where the TV sent data or how much.

Wireshark Open at 2:11

Caveat No visible change does not prove recognition kept running. It means the opt-out could not be checked either way. The captions say Q8K; the model tested was the TCL QM8K.

Another test team tried to decrypt the traffic and could not, because the TVs would not accept their certificate.

“In an attempt to look inside these packets, we tried setting up multiple man-in-the-middle attacks to try to break the encryption. But, because none of the TVs that we tested offered any facility for installing custom SSL certificates, we weren't able to convince them to encrypt our packets with a key that we would be able to decode.”

The same video says most of the traffic is encrypted, which it calls normal for the internet today, and that there are harmless reasons for a TV to send a lot of data.

Attempted interception of the TVs' encrypted traffic Open at 4:19

Caveat The video does not name the TVs it tested. This shows the traffic could not be read, not what is in it.

A study of US homes found most smart TVs using Google's DNS servers instead of the router's, which gets past network blockers.

“Smart home IoT devices are often configured with hard-coded DNS servers such as Google public DNS.”

Measured passively on the home gateways of 220 US homes over 19 days in February 2018. The paper's summary says 72% of smart TVs used hard-coded Google DNS; its results section gives 68%. It adds that hard-coded DNS defeats network-level blocking such as a Pi-hole, because those lookups never reach it.

Passive traffic logs from instrumented home gateways Open the document, 22 Jan 2020

Caveat The data is from 2018, and the paper counts streaming devices as smart TVs. It gives two different figures without explaining the gap, so read it as "most", not as a precise share. It also cuts against network blocking, including our own Box.

The do-not-sell control is off by default and buried before the set is ever connected.

Found in the menus of a television that had not yet joined a network or been shown any agreement, on the sets the investigation tested.

Open at 22:08

Installing an app raised six agreements with an accept-all button pre-highlighted, when two were required.

Four of the six were optional. The accept-all option was the highlighted one.

Open at 22:51

A researcher decompiling the firmware found a final upload on opting out.

“They do send one final snapshot of all tracking data to Alphonso upon opting out, though, which is pretty dirty of them.”

Described from reading the decompiled firmware rather than from a captured upload.

Open at 23:16

Caveat This comes from code analysis, read aloud from the researcher's notes. Later in the same investigation the notes describe it as a snapshot of the majority of the information, not all of it. We have not seen a packet capture of that upload, so treat it as reported rather than measured.

With voice features on, the capture window stays open after you stop speaking.

Following the wake phrase, capture continues until speech and similar noise stop for roughly ten to fifteen seconds. With the microphone sensitivity raised, speech was picked up from tens of feet away in the test building.

Open at 52:14

Caveat This follows a wake phrase or an enabled voice feature. The investigation does not show these televisions recording ambient conversation with voice features never enabled, except through an exploit. We do not claim that they do.

LG's voice agreement has the person who accepts it consent for everyone else in the room.

“I have obtained consent from all other members of my household whose information may be collected through this smart media product and am providing consent on their behalf.”

Gamers Nexus, reading the agreement: customers "need to obtain consent from other household members or guests in the household whose voices may be overheard by LG." The same agreement says voice information may be transferred to other countries, including Korea, and kept for six months.

Open at 1:07:22

Caveat This is the agreement for LG's voice features. It applies when those are used, not to every LG TV. We quote it as read in the video and have not seen the agreement text ourselves.

LG's ad business calls its content recognition a double opt-in. The investigation found one.

“Our ACR technology is a double opt-in experience for consumers, and we believe that's extremely important.”

Immediately after the clip, Gamers Nexus: "As far as we could tell, we only received a single opt-in for ACR."

Open at 1:15:35

Caveat The clip is from 2022 and the investigation tested 2026 firmware, so the setup may have changed in between rather than the claim being false when made.

The setting is hard to find partly because of what it is called.

“Finding this and turning it off on your TV though can be a little bit tricky since most brands refer to it euphemistically, giving it a name that sounds less sinister than we're watching what you watch. Names like smart interactivity or live plus.”

The video gives two examples. Live Plus is LG's name for it; our guides list the name each maker uses.

Open at 2:54

Each brand RTINGS tested gives the setting a different name.

“you might have to look under settings labeled viewing data, viewing information, interactive services, enhanced viewing, or some other label entirely depending on the brand or the platform.”

The written report lists them: Enhanced Viewing Service on Hisense VIDAA, Interactive Service on TCL, Viewing Information Services on Samsung, Viewing Data on Vizio, Viewing Information Agreement on LG, and Samba Interactive TV on Sony.

Open at 5:19

Reporters needed between 10 and 37 clicks to turn content recognition off.

“Depending on the platform, turning off ACR took us between 10 and 37 clicks.”

Counted for a 2023 guide covering Roku, Samsung and LG. The guide gives 27 clicks for LG's Live Plus.

Counting remote-control clicks on each platform Open the document, 12 Dec 2023

Caveat Counted in 2023 on three platforms. Menus have moved since, so the count on your TV may differ.

A reviewer followed a published guide on his own Sony, and the menus did not match.

“I have to say there were some inconsistencies between what was in the process or the procedure that the article laid out and what I actually found in my menu system.”

He was following a ZDNet guide on a Sony A95L. He found Samba Interactive TV under System instead of where the guide said, and the guide's Samba Services Manager steps did not exist on his set.

Open at 3:35

Caveat One reviewer and one TV. It shows how quickly written steps go stale, not that any one guide is wrong for every set.

Menus change between model years, and even between firmware updates.

“They're so complicated and different model years can easily have different menu structures. Even firmware updates to a given TV could easily alter the menu structure.”

His conclusion after the guide did not match his set. He still recommends turning content recognition off, and taking time to work out where your own menus differ.

Open at 7:07

Sony says switching Samba off stops the collection. Deleting what it already has takes an email.

“By disabling it, Samba Interactive TV stops collecting your TV’s content viewing history.”

Samba Interactive TV is Samba TV's content recognition, which Sony says is embedded in the firmware of the BRAVIA sets it lists. For viewing history already collected, the same page says to contact Samba TV at privacy@samba.tv.

Open the document, 10 Feb 2026

Caveat This is Sony's description of a third party's service, not a measurement. The model list on Sony's US page is mostly older sets, and Sony notes the setting may be in a different place on your model.

On current Vizio TVs, one kind of data collection can only be switched off with a factory reset.

“For VIZIO OS TVs, you can turn off Activity Data by resetting your TV to factory settings.”

Activity Data covers settings, inputs, clicks and impressions. Viewing Data, Vizio's content-recognition setting, is separate: it can be turned off at any time under All Settings > Privacy & Legal > Viewing Data, and Vizio says doing so deletes the past Viewing Data logs for that TV.

Open the document, Read 23 Sep 2026

Caveat Vizio says Activity Data is needed for the smart features, and is not tied to your name unless you sign in and also opt in to Viewing Data. RTINGS reported the same reset requirement on the Vizio it tested.

A US regulator found one maker tracked every input, from cable boxes to DVD players, without consent.

“Starting in February 2014, VIZIO, Inc. and an affiliated company have manufactured VIZIO smart TVs that capture second-by-second information about video displayed on the smart TV, including video from consumer cable, broadband, set-top box, DVD, over-the-air broadcasts, and streaming devices.”

Vizio paid $2.2 million to settle charges that it collected viewing data on 11 million televisions without consumers' knowledge or consent, and was required to get affirmative consent from then on.

Open the document, 6 Feb 2017

Caveat These were the agencies' allegations, settled without trial, and they concern Vizio's practice at the time.

A US state sued five of the biggest TV makers over content recognition.

“This software can capture screenshots of a user's television display every 500 milliseconds, monitor viewing activity in real time, and transmit that information back to the company without the user's knowledge or consent.”

The suits named Sony, Samsung, LG, Hisense and TCL. Samsung and LG have since settled; the entries below.

Open the document, 15 Dec 2025

Caveat These are allegations in a lawsuit, not findings. The "can capture screenshots" wording is the state's, and the LG investigation above found current LG firmware sends a fingerprint rather than an image.

Samsung agreed to stop collecting viewing data in Texas without express consent.

“Samsung must halt any collection or processing of ACR viewing data without obtaining Texas consumers' express consent.”

The agreement also requires clear disclosures and consent screens on its smart TVs.

Open the document, 26 Feb 2026

Caveat Applies to Texas consumers. It is a settlement, not a court finding.

LG agreed to stop using content recognition in Texas without informed consent.

“LG will no longer use Automated Content Recognition technology to collect consumers' viewing data without their informed consent.”

LG must show a pop-up disclosure and a clear way to opt out. The suits against Sony, Hisense and TCL were not settled in these releases.

Open the document, 11 May 2026

Caveat Applies to Texas consumers. It is a settlement, not a court finding.

The UK privacy regulator says it will check whether TV makers give people a real choice.

“We will be engaging with connected TV manufacturers this year to assess whether they are complying with the law and offering consumers meaningful choice over how their data is used.”

Said as the ICO published its final guidance on smart devices, which expects protective settings on by default and consent that is a clear opt-in and just as easy to withdraw.

Open the document, 11 Jun 2026

Caveat A statement of intent, not a finding against any maker. The guidance applies in the UK.

The advertising subsidiary reported roughly $185 million in sales in a single quarter.

Alphonso, the incorporated name behind LG Ad Solutions, in LG's own financial documents for the first quarter of 2026, with about $22 million in profit.

Open at 1:19:41

Caveat Converted from Korean won in the source, and the automatic captions garble the won figure. Check LG's filing directly before quoting it.

For one maker, the televisions lost money and the advertising platform made it.

Vizio in 2023: the device group, televisions and sound bars, brought in about $1.1 billion at a gross margin of minus 0.8%. The platform group, which includes advertising, brought in about $598 million at a gross margin of 61%.

Open at 1:20:59

The executive who says they own the glass settled fraud charges with the SEC in 2019.

Relating to his time at a previous company, with a financial penalty and a ten-year bar from serving as an officer or director of a public company.

Open at 1:14:50

Caveat Verify against the SEC's own order before repeating this anywhere public. It is a serious claim about a named person and it deserves a primary source, not a secondary one.

A researcher examining the logs found content recognition running on an HDMI input.

“Even an HDMI connection was undergoing ACR.”

This is the finding that matters for an office, where the television is usually showing a laptop rather than its own apps.

Open at 19:52

On an LG set, recognition traffic was heaviest with a console or laptop plugged in over HDMI.

“But, the network activity became much more active when we connected a PlayStation 5 or a laptop.”

On the LG G5, RTINGS saw recognition traffic on the idle home screen, in built-in apps and while playing video from a USB drive. Gaming on a PS5 and browsing on a laptop over HDMI made it considerably more frequent and larger.

Wireshark Open at 2:40

Caveat Measured on one set, the LG G5. The video goes on to say every TV tracks everything you plug in, but the measurement behind that is this one LG. RTINGS says it cannot tell from the traffic why HDMI produced more.

A surgeon in training raised the patient-information question directly.

“What happens when I'm taking a patient phone call, or I'm doing patient video visits, and there's an LG monitor in the background? What happens if it's doing it on an LG monitor itself? What's listening in? How is that patient information protected?”

Asked on camera. It is a question, not a finding: the investigation did not test a monitor in a clinic.

Open at 1:35:15

The privacy policy claims information about every device linked to the television.

The investigation's summary of the policy, not a quotation from it: information about every device linked to the TV, whether a console, a phone or a DVD player, and other connected devices that may include light bulbs, switches and appliances.

Open at 1:06:08